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REVIEW ARTICLE 
The Reasoning Game: Some Pragmatic Suggestions 
Allan C. Hutchinson* 
 
Cass Sunstein, Legal Reasoning And Political Conflict, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996, 220 pp, hb $25.00. 
 
It seems like whole libraries or, at least, large tracts of them, have been written 
about the mysterious concept and practice of legal reasoning. Although there 
has been much toing-and-froing around the matter, the common wisdom still 
prevails that, as Chief Justice Coke put it in the 17th century, there is an 
'artificial Reason and Judgment of Law which requires long Study and 
Experience before a Man can attain to the Cognizance of it.' By this, it is usually 
meant that law has its own special form of reasoning that distinguishes it in 
some important way from other disciplines and other forms of reasoning 
(economic, scientific, logical, political, sociological, etc). Like all reasoning, 
legal reasoning is a process of argumentation by which it is possible to infer 
or move from one already accepted proposition to another that has yet to be 
accepted. Of course, everyone agrees that legal reasoning is distinctive to the 
extent that it works upon a particular set of materials (cases and statutes), is 
framed in a professional jargon (eg, stare decisis and obiter dicta), and is 
engaged in by a restricted community of professionals (lawyers and judges). 
However, that is as far as any agreement goes. As central as it is to the whole 
legal enterprise, the precise identity or nature of legal reasoning remains 
elusive; it defies simple classification or easy analysis. As such, much 
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contemporary jurisprudence remains fixated with clarifying and justifying the 
operation and status of legal reasoning. 
While most lawyers and judges continue to insist that 'legal reasoning has a 
logic of its own ... [whose] structure fits it to give meaning to ambiguity,' 1 I 
maintain that such a formalistic position is both untenable and unnecessary. 
Shorn of its legal nomenclature and doctrinal dressing, legal reasoning is 
simply a general and non-specific style of reasoning which lawyers have 
colonised and at which judges have become particularly adept; the claim that 
legal reasoning is special not only in its formal attributes, but also in its 
ability to arrive at substantively better and worse answers cannot be sustained. 
As a normative exercise, it is not an empirical matter of truth or falsity: legal 
reasoning is less a demonstration of logical necessity and more a practice of 
human justification. More particularly, legal reasoning is a mode of playful 
and rhetorical activity. This insight has been latched upon as the basis of a 
neo-pragmatic revival in jurisprudence. However, as exemplified in the 
esteemed work of Cass Sunstein, these efforts to construe law and 
adjudication as a practical activity flatter, but only to disappoint: the new 
nonformalist packaging belies the old formalist commitment. In contrast, I 
will offer a different understanding of legal reasoning that is thoroughly 
pragmatic i n ambition and elaboration. I insist that adjudication, like much 
of life itself, is best understood as a playful attempt by judges to engage in 
a language game that seeks to regulate social life. By depicting 
adjudication as a non-formalist game of infinite proportions, my account 
seeks to explain and evaluate adjudication in such a way that it captures 
its sense as a peculiar professional practice (in which it stands as 
something of its own thing) and as a profoundly political undertaking (in 
which it is organically related to the larger context of society). In this 
way, it might be possible to realise that law is not so much a site that is 
located aside or away from ordi nary life and that adjudication is not so 
much an activity that can be appreciated as separate from ordinary li vi ng: 
law is a part of, not apart from, life and adjudication represents one site 
and way of playing the game of life.2 
The essay is divided into six parts. First, I introduce the basic 
orientation of Sunstein's pragmatic accou nt of law and his emphasis on 
analogical reasoning and incompletely theorised agreements as the keys 
to legal casuistry. In the next three short sections, I criticise the 
limitations of Sunstein 's account analogical reasoning hides rather 
than does away with the historical values and social ideas that energise 
the law's operation; incompletely theorised agreements are not so 
much under-theorised as under-agreed-to to do the work asked of 
them; and the fixed precedential points that anchor legal reasoning 
allow much more movement than suggested. The last two sections offer 
a deconstructive account of 'play' that better captures the general 
practice of legal reasoning at large. Resisting the tendency to 
transcendentalise or divinise notions like 'play' by turning them into 
metaphysical entities, I treat legal reasoning as playful moves in a 
pragmatic game and trace the implications of this non-formalist 
approach for the practical performance and theoretical justification 
  
of the judicial craft. In short, I want to insist that, in law's language 
game, there is nothing to ground play, but more play: there is no final or 
privileged way to play law's game that explains and grounds all others 
that is not itself a game. 
 
 
The pragmatic gambit 
Eschewing the hubristic aspirations of natural lawyers and other 
formalists, a new breed of pragmatists have sought to re-valorise law and 
adjudication as a professional practice in which practical people pursue 
practical ends through practical means.3 As a 'back to basics' movement, 
legal neo-pragmatism is not so much a philosophy or methodology, but 
more a way of professional life: it nurtures an existential ethic of inquiry 
rather than inculcates a catechism of substantive outcomes. By treating 
truth and correctness as experiential and experimental rather than apodictic 
and apocalyptic, adjudication comes to be understood as involving 
nurtured prudence, not revealed knowledge. While law remains a noble 
calling under such a perspective, its practitioners are more artisans than 
artists and more technicians than grand theorists; Cardozo, Holmes, 
Learned Hand and Llewellyn are their heroes. Extolling the practical 
virtues of intellectual self-discipline and traditional craft, legal pragmatists 
conceive of law as being much more playful and practice-based than other 
contemporary jurists. However, while appreciating that adjudication is a 
kind of game, they do not have the confidence of their convictions in pushing 
through on the subversive implications of their insight that legal reasoning is 
all about 'making moves' in a finite game of infinite possibilities. 
Cass Sunstein is at the forefront of this pragmatist revival. In Legal 
Reasoning and Political Conflict, his professed ambition is to restore the 
fading, but vital faith in the worth and viability of the legal craft. While 
legal reasoning is a rule-based practice, law is not exhausted by the existence 
or application of rules; rules are an important resource, but they do not 
themselves fix the distinguishing characteristic of legal thinking because 
'ideal justice outstrips rules; it adapts the account to the particulars of the 
case' (p 135). More fundamentally, law is about reason-giving as much as it 
is about decision-making or rule-application. According to Sunstein, law 
devlops by self-conscious attention to its argumentative structure as much as 
by a formal consistency with substantive outcomes. Nevertheless, rules are 
important because they 'sharply discipline the territory over which argument 
can occur' (p 191). For Sunstein, the life of the law is the (ana)logic of its 
own experience; there is method in the seeming madness of legal reasoning 
that is peculiarly and especially its own. Lawyers should not be embarrassed 
by their instinctive habits of mind or argumentative routines, but shou ld 
recognise and celebrate their pragmatic force and dispositive power. While he 
treasures coherence, Sunstein believes its demands are satisfied by much less 
than a snug fit between the almost infinite range of concrete propositions and 
their controlling abstract principles: law is neither wholly reducible to 
unadulterated politics nor wholly inflatable into pure integrity. Under this 
pragmatic calling, the judge is bound by an official tradition of legal 
  
reasoning, but has room to experiment within its confines. While politics are 
always involved in legal disputations, the judge can remain agnostic and act 
in a uniquely and proudly legal way: law might be political, but it is not 
merely political. 
For Sunstein, therefore, the special method of the law is to be found 
in its traditional reliance on analogical reasoning. While analogical 
reasoning is pervasive in law and everyday life, 'analogical reasoning is 
the key to legal casuistry' (p 32) and 'lies at the heart of legal thinking and 
for good reason' (p 99); it has a distinctive structure and faces distinctive 
constraints. Because analogical reasoning imposes a certain discipline, there 
is less need for a widespread moral or political consensus. Indeed, Sunstein's 
reliance on incompletely theorised agreements seems to have virtually 
eliminated the need for any agreement on such issues. As the most 
familiar means of legal reasoning, analogical reasoning ru ns neither 
inductively from particulars to generalities nor deductively from 
generalities to particulars, but moves from particulars to particulars: 
analogical reasoning is not syllogistic and scientific in form and function, 
but is practical and probabilistic. The beauty of legal reasoning is that it 
allows lawyers and judges to engage with political and moral values 
without reducing law to an open-ended ideological debate and without 
collapsing it into some other field of knowledge, like politics or economics. 
Large-scale debate about controversial issues is avoided by the fact that legal 
reasoning functions by relying on 'a set of practices, conventions, and 
outcomes . . . [that] makes legal interpretation possible ... and sharply 
constrains legal judgment' (p 13). This legal culture of syntactic and 
substantive principles places off-limits certain deep conflicts over the 
right and good as being too ideological and unsuited to legal resolution; 
'the lawyer's questions have everything to do with constraints of 
competence and role' {p 34) and 'there can be a real difference betwe 
the legally correct outcome and the morally correct outcome' (p 92). 
Sunstein's account of how analogical reasoning works is fairly 
uncontroversial but it is the claims that he makes for its operation that are 
decidedly controversial in character. He highlights four steps in the 
analogical process: ( I ) fact pattern has certain characteristics A, B, and C; (2) 
fact pattern Y differs from X i n some; respects, but shares certain other 
characteristics A, B, and C; (3) the law treats X ir a certain way; and (4) 
because fact pattern Y shares certain characteristics with fac1 pattern X, the 
law should treat fact pattern Y in the same way. Obviously, the application of 
such an analogical process involves normative judgments about relevance and 
valence in terms of the similarities and differences between fac1 patterns. 
However, according to Sunstein, the legitimacy and genius of analogical 
reasoning as a legal practice is that it 'will impose a certain discipline . . . 
[suet that] there can be a real difference between the legally correct outcome 
and the; morally correct outcome; the difference lies in the fact that 
analogies will operate; as entirely "fixed points" in legal reasoning , whereas 
many of these are revisabk in morality' (pp 91-92). Moreover, in 
understanding analogical reasoning in thi5 way as the key manoeuvre in the 
judicial repertoire of legal moves, judges 'need not, much of the time, 
  
attempt to say much about large-scale social controversies' (p 195). In this 
important sense, therefore, analogical reasoning is different from and preferable 
to other forms of legal argumentation, such as resort to abstrac1 theories of 
'wealth maximization' or 'natural rights', because it operates at a mud more 
concrete and modest level and in a much less theoretical and piecemeal way: 
it does not need to take a stand on such ideological and controversial 
matters. A5 such, analogical reasoning is the most effective, legitimate and 
just form of legal argumentation in that it achieves 'principled consistency, a 
focus on particulars, incompletely theorised  judgments and  principles  
operating  at  a  low  01 intermediate level of abstraction' (p 67). 
The bulk of Sunstein's monograph is appropriately devoted to a rich 
series o1 practical illustrations about the operation of analogical reasoning 
and the legitimacy of incompletely theorised agreements. He 
demonstrates an enviably wide and subtle appreciation of the common law. 
Indeed, the great strength of all his work is the lucid and concrete way in 
which he makes and defends his jurisprudential claims; jargon is eschewed 
and Sunstein works hard to keep his discussion accessible to the non-
specialist. However, despite the obvious appeal o1 this pragmatic and 
relatively playful approach, the new pragmatism tends to be pragmatic in 
the most non-pragmatic and, at times, almost anti-pragmatic way. 
Although paying lip-service to the decidedly pragmatic qualities of 
contextual sensitivity and prudential judgment, Sunstein is far too concerned 
with discovering and defining The Way Things Really Are. By 
demonstrating that 'analogical reasoning is the key to legal casuistry' (p 32) 
he enlists pragmatism to complete the formalist campaign of demonstrating 
that law is a self-sufficient system that can produce correct, determinate, 
predictable and distinctly legal outcomes. This is a flat denial of the 
pragmatist's belief that legal reasoning is not really about anything unique 
or special at all. Indeed, from a more rigorously pragmatic perspective, 
legal reasoning is what it is and what it is is historically contingent and 
socially revisable. Legal reasoning is nothing more (and nothing less) than 
how particular lawyers reason at particular times. While some modes of legal 
reasoning lend themselves better to some tasks than others, this conclusion 
entails a contingent evaluation of their practical utility in particular 
situations. It does not involve fixing 'the nature of legal reasoning' because 
it has none in any essential 01 lasting sense: there is no neutral or reliable 
algorithm for legal decision-making or any other kind. 
 
Beyond analogy 
While it is true that the law is much more pragmatic and less analytical 
than most contemporary theorists pretend or allow, it strains the bounds of 
credibility to promote analogical reasoning as the underwriter of correct, 
determinate and distinctly legal operations and outcomes. On the contrary, 
although analogical reasoning plays an important and frequent role in 
law's reasoning game, it is thoroughly indeterminate in practice and 
consequence. Most typically, this indeterminacy will manifest itself where 
fact pattern Y has more or less similarities with and differences from fact 
pattern X. As no two cases are ever entirely the same or different, this 
  
will occur almost all the time. For example, fact pattern X might be 
comprised of characteristics A, B, C, D, and E, but fact pattern Y might 
possess either A, B, C, and D or A, B, C, D, E, and F. In either case, 
there is nothing internal to the process of analogical reasoning that can 
determine whether the existence of one more, less or different 
characteristic is sufficient to warrant treating fact pattern Y like fact 
pattern X or not. Indeed, the addition or subtraction of one characteristic 
might alter the collective meaning of the other characteristics: without C, 
the remaining characteristics A, B, D, and E might take on a very 
different significance and, with F, the characteristics A, B, C, D, and E 
might amount to a very different whole. Also, it might happen that in 
fact pattern X, a re-appraisal might suggest that its relevant characteristics 
were not A, B, C, D, and E, but really were A, B, C, and D or A, B, C, 
D, E, and F. For instance, once it is decided that a car is a 'vehicle' in 
terms of the rule that there are to be 'no vehicles in the park', whether a 
person on roller-blades is a 'vehicle' will depend on the presumed or 
postulated purpose of such a rule is it intended to reduce noise, cut down 
on traffic, protect the safety of pedestrians, etc? 
In almost all circumstances, there will be a pragmatic embarrassment 
of analogical riches. If good arguments are the touchstone of law and 
its legitimate functioning, there are simply too many good arguments 
for the pragmatists' peace of mind. In this situation, while fact pattern 
Y has characteristics A, B, C, D, and E, there are two earlier fact 
patterns W and X that were disposed of in entirely opposite ways; 
fact pattern W has characteristics A, B, and C and fact pattern X has 
characteristics C, D, and E. There is no way to compare the relative 
cogency of the two competing analogical options without resort to 
some values or principles that are extraneous to the process of 
analogical reasoning itself.4 Yet analogical reasoning does not 
determine the result; it is only a testing device for the more important 
political determinations that are made prior to and after analogical 
testing occurs. At every stage, the judge is obliged to make resort to 
the values and principles that analogical reasoning is intended to 
finesse. Analogical reasoning is thereby debilitated by the same 
weaknesses that afflict a rule-based account of law. In the same way 
that it is never possible to simply 'follow the rules', because the 
question of the relevant and precise rule and what following it entails 
remains irresolvably contestable, it is also not possible to simply 
engage in analogical reasoning, because the question of the relevant 
and precise analogy and what following it entails remains irresolvably 
contestable. Accordingly, in contrast to Sunstein, I do not believe that, in 
deciding 'whether one case is analogous to another, we need not, much of the 
time, attempt to say much about large-scale social controversies' (p 195); 
analogical reasoning hides rather than does away with the historical values 
and social ideas that energise the law's operation. 
For analogical reasoning to be cogent and compelling, there must be 
sufficient justification to warrant the inference that, because property X is 
present i n one instance, it is present i n another. But there is no way to identify 
  
or confirm through the logic of analogical argument itself that certain 
characteristics are present or that any inference are warrantable. This is a 
matter of imputation, not demonstration. Indeed, analogical reasoning must 
be complemented and supplemented by resort to what Sunstein is most at 
pains to avoid what he describes as 'large-scale social controversies' if it is 
to make any sense at all. Conversely, with recourse to such external values, 
his formalist-style claims about the 'real difference between the legally correct 
outcome and the morally correct outcome' (p 92) ring hollow. Moreover, 
because pragmatism is more ad hoc than a priori, any juristic attempt to 
effect a more programmatic or systematic appeal to political or social values 
ceases to be pragmatic. Like his pragmatic predecessors, Sunstein fails to 
provide any guide as to how distinguish good from bad analogical reasoning. 
On this crucial question, he is left with Levi's inadequate conclusion that 'the 
determination of similarity and difference is the function of each judge' and 
that 'legal reasoning tests constantly whether society has come to see new 
differences or similarities.'5 While this strikes an agreeable note within a 
non-formalist approach, it is cold comfort to Sunstein's formalist 
commitments. In short, while analogical reasoning is an important dimension 
of legal reasoning, it cannot provide the vital grounding that the new 
pragmatists suggest. 
Unclear about whether analogical reasoning acts as a constraint on law 
or whether law acts as a constraint on analogical reasoning, Sunstein and 
other pragmatists are unable to overcome the criticism that the analytical 
validity of the substantive outcome is not warranted by the analogical 
form of the legal argument. It is not the force of Reason, analogical or 
otherwise, that determines what is important and relevant in legal decision-
making, but what is substantively reasonable and contingently acceptable 
as a matter of practical reason. As such, the determinacy or correctness of 
legal reasoning is not closed, but open and, therefore, is as much political 
as it is legal. While there are constraints that exist and are experienced by 
lawyers and judges, these constraints are less determinate and more 
revisable than is conceded. Constraints are as re-interpretable as the 
reasoning that they are intended to constrain. Of course, it is not that 
there are not better or worse answers or even correct ones, but that 
'there is never any "correct legal solution" that is other than the correct 
ethical and political solution to that legal problem.' 6 Again, that is, of 
course, 'correct' in the contingent and contextual sense that certain people 
for certain purposes at a certain time and place are persuaded that it is 
correct. A resoundingly pragmatic account does not deny the existence of 
such a standard, but de-stabilises its status and grounding. 
 
Not so fixed 
If Sunstein is to make good on this deficiency, his primary responsibility must 
be to establish a distinctly legal standard against which to measure the 
weighting of the various similarities and differences. He maintains that, as 
judges' convictions about the meaning and importance of certain decisions 
will warrant a certain priority in constraining the potentially open-ended 
operation of analogical reasoning, there are certain defining moments or 'fixed 
  
points' of legal precedent that require judges 'to square current judicial 
decisions with previous judicial decisions that have stood the test of ti me' (p 
82) and, therefore, 'real constraint on judicial discretion . . . comes from 
precedent' (p 179). For example, the fact that all judges accept that certain 
cases, such as Brown and Roe ,1 must be incorporated into any proposed theory 
about the American Constitution emboldens Sunstein to maintain that 'legal 
reasoning has a distinctive structure and faces distinctive constraints' (p 75). 
However, while it might be possible to agree on a handful of fixed 
precedential points, they would be so limited as to be of little practical use: any 
attempts to enlarge this crucial category sufficiently for it to become 
practically operative will meet sharp and sectarian political disagreement. 
Moreover, even though Sunstein acknowledges that such fixed points 'do not 
speak for themselves, and judgments about their meanings have large creative 
dimensions' (p 82), it is difficult to understand how Brown or Roe have a 
settled and shared interpretation capable of providing the necessary direction 
and force to get analogical reasoning up and running. Both Brown and Roe 
have been subjected to intense public attempts at interested interpretation and 
represent a site for the manufacture of meaning as much as an adequate 
grounding for its resolution. Moreover, as Brown and Roe aptly illustrate, the 
genesis of these fixed precedential points is to be found in strikingly creative 
and non-analogical judicial acts that break with existing legal traditions. and re-
orient the whole legal enterprise. For all his pragmatic protestations, Sunstein's 
account and defence of analogical reasoning remains profoundly abstruse and 
rationalistic in the sense that it is unsituated in the material circumstances of 
history and is inured to their political dynamics: 'abstract universality' is 
ditched, but only to be replaced by 'abstract particularity'. For a pragmatic 
approach that is supposed to valorise experience and contextuality, there is 
little appreciation that legal reasoning operates in the real world of historical 
struggle or of how law does (and does not) change. For Sunstein, the only 
experience and context that matters is the legal one: the experience of the law 
is the life of its own (ana)logic. He makes no attempt to place Roe or Brown 
in their larger social settings so that it might be possible to appreciate the 
political dynamics of feminism and protest or the struggle for racial justice 
that impinged upon the legal process. On his terms, legal change is nothing 
more than the playing out of a legalistic game of analogical reasoning,  with 
victory going to the analogically fleet and agile of mind. The pernicious effect 
of such a formulation is that legal change is not thought of as part of a socio-
political process nor as even a pragmatic response to changing historical 
conditions. Instead, it is viewed solely as the culmination of the internal and 
irresistible force of legal reasoning. Notwithstanding many formalists' 
opinions to the contrary, it is surely unpardonable for lawyers and law 
professors to present themselves as the exclusive architects of legal and social 
change. To portray the development of legal doctrine as being brought about 
largely by dint of analogical reasoning is both dangerous and self-serving; 
dangerous because it trivialises the vital role of popular struggle and self-
serving because it conveniently portrays academics as the saviours of social 
justice. On the contrary, analogical reasoning is mere prelude or postscript to 
a political letter. 
  
Legal change is as much about political action as it is about making good 
legal arguments. Decisions like Brown and Roe become 'fixed poi nts' in the 
shifting constitutional universe not because they are legally correct or 
analytically sound, but because they are considered politically valid and 
socially acceptable. The difference between Plessy v Ferguson 8 and Brown 
has nothing to do with interpretive cogency or hermeneutical integrity i n 
constitutional doctrine; analogical reasoning was not a decisive factor. It has 
everything to do with changing currents and concerns in the political context 
that frame and condition such germinal and disruptive judicial decisions. 
Plessy ceased to be a fixed point on the constitutional compass because it no 
longer enjoyed sufficient political confidence and public support; its 
perception as having an analytically weak or analogically suspect status was 
beside the historical point. Rightness was a matter of social policy and 
political persuasion, not constitutional law. Indeed, without abandoning his 
cherished attachment to analogical reasoning and the discredited doctrine of 
stare decisis, Sunstein would have been hard pressed to recognise Brown as a 
sound or correct legal decision in the summer of 1954. Like many other 
jurists, he would be thrown on the painful horns of the perennial formalist 
dilemma-either he would have to renounce his legal faith if he was to 
maintain his political bel iefs or he could hold fast to his legal faith and 
accept the law's reactionary and, in that case, racist ethos. 
 
Incomplete agreements 
While it might well be the case that 'to argue from one factual situation and 
to decide by analogy is a natural tendency of the human and legal mind,' 9 it is 
not the be-all-and-end-all of law and it most certainly is not the hallmark of 
legal practice that distinguishes it from moral, political or ideological 
contestation. Indeed, it is only one part of law's repertoire of argumentative 
moves. Moreover, far from being insulated from large-scale moral 
controversies, analogical reasoning gains its intellectual purchase and practical 
efficacy by virtue of its resort to social and political values. Sunstein 
reluctantly concedes this, but insists that incompletely theorised agreements 
function as 'foundations for both rules and analogies' (p 6). Such agreements 
allow judges to ground particular outcomes in something more substantial 
than their own legal instincts, but less demanding than a fully thought out 
theory or consensus for their political convictions; 'while people diverge on 
some relatively high-level proposition, they might be able to agree when they 
lower the level of abstraction' (p 37). By reference to such mid-level 
artefacts, he defends his claim that the legal arena does and should stand 
separately from any political involvement. Accordingly, as well as being 
pragmatically useful, incompletely theorised agreements allow judges to get 
on with their task without having to take a definitive or Hercu lean stand on 
deep political or moral values.JO In this way, Sunstein's championing of 
incompletely theorised agreements not only serves to explain how judges 
reach particular outcomes, but also illuminates the hallmark of a well-
functioni ng legal system because they are 'an important source of social 
stability and . . . enable people to l ive together to permit them to show each 
other a measure of reciprocity and mutual respect' (pp 5 and 39). 
  
Sunstein is quick to admit that, on occasion, disagreements can be desirable 
and incompletely theorised agreements can run the risk of reaching an 
outcome that is 'mistaken' (p 58) in situations where there may be widespread 
agreement about general value-judgements, but the agreement is nevertheless 
incompletely theorised. This, of course, prompts the query of why this 
outcome must be considered 'mistaken' and on what basis it might be 
possible for judges to subject incompletely theorised agreements to 'scrutiny 
and critique' (p 59). Sunstein acknowledges that it would be foolish to deny 
that some general theories sometimes get it right, and even more foolish to 
suggest that incompletely theorised agreements warrant respect whatever their 
content: 'except in unusual situations and for multiple reasons, general 
theories are an unlikely foundation for judge-made law, and caution and 
humility about general theory are appropriate for courts, at least when 
multiple theories can lead in the same direction' (p 59). While this could be 
interpreted as meaning that he is doing away with any foundation to legal 
reasoning at all, it is more reasonable to assume that he is merely replacing 
one foundation with another. Besides being the stuff of what good legal 
decisions comprise, incompletely theorised agreements are positioned to 
become Sunstein's contribution to the formalist task of determining 'the 
crucial part of the lawyer's distinctive solution to social pluralism' (p 59). 
For Sunstein, the need to make the system work on a daily basis is of 
paramount importance; efficacy is treasured more than consistency or 
candour. Indeed, he makes the telling suggestion that, where judges have 
conflicting political frameworks, what is left unsaid can be as important as 
what is said and that judges should keep silent so as to facilitate agreement 
on outcomes in particular cases; 'silence on something that may prove false, 
obtuse, or excessively contentious can help minimise conflict, allow the 
present to learn from the future, and save a great deal of time and expense' (p 
39). On the other hand, Sunstein also maintains that 'if judges ... have actually 
agreed on a general theory, and if they are really committed to it, they 
should say so' (p 44). One could be forgiven for asking how judges could 
ever know they had reached agreement on such general theories in the first 
place, if they took Sunstein's vow of silence. Perhaps Sunstein also wondered 
about this when he later concludes that, 'in law, as in politics, disagreement 
can be a productive and creative force, revealing error, showing gaps, moving 
discussion and results in good directions' (p 58). While this assessment 
seems to the jurisprudential point, it is an odd statement for someone who is 
committed to demonstrating that judges can resolve 'large, contested issues of 
social life' in a distinctly legal way rather than 'only on . . . a sectarian basis' 
(p 42). 
Even if one accepts Sunstein's claim that incompletely theorised 
agreements can come to the rescue of analogical reasoning, he is still left 
with severe problems to overcome. For instance, in Sunstein's world, two 
judges may appeal to the same or different principles in order to energise 
analogical reasoning, but, so long as they both lead to the same outcome, 
there is no cause for concern. It does not matter why fact pattern X and Y 
are deemed analogous; all that matters is that the dispute is resolved. Indeed, 
Sunstein worries that any attempt to explain what general theory was decisive 
  
might jeopardise the result. However, in this case, incompletely theorised 
agreements are less facilitating adjudication and more concealing the actual 
basis of each judge's decision. While one judge may view A as the relevant 
characteristic, another may hold B to be. If, however, the justification for 
why X and Y are held to be analogous is ignored, there is no possibility 
for predicting whether L or M may also be analogous. Stare decisis 
seems to have become so much un necessary baggage in the pragmatic 
enterprise. Furthennore, a more serious problem wou ld arise when there 
is no agreement at this more general level. Incompletely theorised 
agreements can only be possible or viable, if both parties have at least 
some reason for accepting the result in question. If there is none, the 
judges are thrown back on their own political instincts. In such 
circumstances, the reliance upon incompletely theorised agreements as 
'foundations for both rules and analogies' (p 6) seems hopelessly 
inadequate. As is so often the case, formalist theories run out at the very 
point where they are most needed. 
In many ways, I do not disagree with Sunstein's claim that judges 
are able to make doctrinal progress by developing incompletely 
theorised agreements on controversial issues; it is a plausible and 
sensible account of judicial practice. However, when it is appreciated 
that Sunstein and I are engaged in very different jurisprudential 
projects, it is difficult to understand how such an account can 
advance Sunstein's ambitions. Whereas Sunstein is intent upon arguing 
that law is a self-sufficient practice that is significantly more 
constrained than political or moral argument and that can generate 
detenninate and legitimate results, I want to offer a more critical account 
in which adjudication is one more site to play politics. Consequently, it is 
only when analogical reasoning is placed within a much broader and 
more expansive non-formalist account of law and adjudication that the 
operation of legal reasoning as a practical exercise in decision-making 
can be fully grasped and appreciated. It is to that task that I briefly tum. 
 
 
Playing the game 
Efforts to utilise notions of 'game' and 'play' as devices for understanding 
various aspects of human thought and behaviour have a distinguished 
philosophical lineage. However, despite general agreement over the 
relevance and utility of such notions, there has been little agreement on 
the role and status that games, as it were, play in illuminating the human 
predicament and advancing its critical analysis. 11 In entering this long-
playing contest, I want to take a very particular strategy and side. The 
traditional stance towards games and play that passes from Plato through 
Kant and Schiller to Huizinga and Caillois apprehends them as activities 
that occur outside and in contrast to reason. Play is a feature of the 
irrational side of life in which chance is opposed to necessity and is 
beyond the ken of analytical knowledge; it is undisciplined and represents 
an arbitrary, unmediated, exuberant, spontaneous, instinctual, chaotic and 
unbou nded outpouring of emotion. In contrast to this tradition, I want to 
  
take my lead from the more subversive work of Saussure and Derrida. 
Rather than treat play as something that is to be set against or 
distinguished from reason or work, I want to defend an understanding of 
game-playing that combines both free-play and structure in a dynamic 
appreciation of the judicial performance in law's continuing game. In  
particular, I want to argue that, as far as the games of law and adjudication 
are concerned, it is always the case that play and reason, rules and 
discretion, and freedom and constraint go hand in hand; these are not so 
much polar opposites or dichotomies as interdependent parts or forces that 
both energise and destabilise the adjudicative challenge. In this 
deconstructive approach, play is treated not so much as irrational, but more 
as part of what it means to be rational: there is no Reason for settling 
arguments about reason that are not themselves part of the game of 
reasoning. 12 
In a seminal essay, Derrida places the notion of play at the heart of the 
deconstructive critique and the subversive claim that 'language bears within 
itself the necessity of its own critique.' 13 He explains how the Western 
philosophical tradition has driven itself to metaphysical distraction by its 
insistence on compressing its thinking about the world into the strait 
jacket of dichotomous opposites chance and necessity, reason and desire, 
mind and body, etc. In particular, he concentrates on the ill-fated effort in 
discursive studies to ground the distinction between structure and free-play 
in 'a fundamental immobility and reassuring certitude . . . beyond the reach 
of free-play.' However, in rejecting the possibility of a structured 
foundation that is privileged over and controls play, Derrida is not 
suggesting that there is somehow a free-play that happens outside of 
structure and that itself controls structure. Derrida insists that, in matters of 
human discourse, there is no question of choosing between, on the one 
hand, a formalist interpretation the 'dreams of deciphering a truth or an 
origin which is free from free-play' and, on the other hand, an anti-formalist 
interpretation the affirmation of a free-play that tries to pass beyond the 
dream 'of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of 
the game.' Instead, what must be done is 'to conceive of the common 
ground and the dijferance of this irreducible difference.' In other words, the 
apparent full presence of totalising structure is only made viable and given 
force by the threatening absence of a disruptive free-play in the same way 
that the apparent full presence of free-play is only rendered threatening by 
the pervasive absence of a stultifying structure. As Derrida states: 
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infinity of a field cannot be 
covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field that is, 
language and a finite language excludes totalisation. This field is in fact that of a game, that 
is to say, a field of infinite substitutions in the closure of a finite ensemble. This field 
permits these infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of 
bei ng an inexhaustible field . . ., instead of bei ng too large, there is something missing from 
it: a centre which arrests and founds the free-play of substitutions. 14 
In terms of jurisprudence, this deconstructive stance can be put to great and 
unsettling effect in the non-formalist project. In the adjudicative 
performance, the structure of rules and the play of discretion interact and 
feed off each other in the game of legal interpretation: play is the element of 
the game that disrupts and destabilises the structured rules that constitute the 
  
game. There is always a tension between order and disorder, freedom and 
constraint, and determinacy and i ndeterminacy that cannot be resolved by a 
totalizing account or performance. For example, it is not possible to think of 
or understand determinacy without i ndeterminacy: each plays off the other in 
the relentless encounter that both makes meaning possible and prevents its 
ultimate grounding. In this way, determinacy and indeterminacy in legal 
interpretation can be understood as locked in a relentless historical struggle 
for dominance that allows only temporary respites, but no final resolution or 
ultimate balance. Determinacy is only realisable against an i nforming 
background of indeterminacy and it is the possibility of determinacy that 
gives the threat of indeterminacy any bite. Accordingly, legal meaning is a 
simultaneous mix of the determinate and indeterminate. In Hartian terms, for 
example, this translates into the acknowledgement that rules will be 
experienced as having a core of accepted meaning and a penumbra of 
uncertainty, but the identity of each will shift and change; what was once 
thought to be at the core will become penumbra! and vice-versa. The relation 
between core and penumbra cannot be described once-and-for-all: it is a 
socio-historical artifact and cannot be reduced to a simple formula or 
overarching narrative. 15 Whether particular interpretations of a rule are or are 
not compatible is not the point. It is the fact that the question of their 
compatibility is always open and contestable. 
Both formalists (and their nihilistic critics) overlook the crucial insight that 
meaning is found in the social interaction of freedom and constraint, not in 
the privileging of one over the other. Whereas formalists, including the 
pragmatic Sunstein, emphasise the stability and pre-dominance of structured 
determinacy over the marginalised threat of a disruptive indeterminacy, anti-
formalists stress the unbounded play of an anarchic indeterminacy over the 
stabilising force of a orderly determinacy. Both are mistaken. In contrast to 
formalist claims, law's game of adjudication has no greater (or lesser) 
legitimacy than that which its participants earn for themselves in their 
performance and play. As practised by its mainstream operatives, legal theory 
exists as a kind of a grand narrative or meta-discourse that is produced by 
the discourse of law to validate its own status as a scientific discourse in the 
sense that it possesses an objectivity and foundation that lies outside itself 
and whose evaluative standards are adequacy, accuracy and Truth itself. In 
short, jurisprudence exists to legitimate the rules of its own game. However, 
there is no metalanguage or one way of playing the game that is intrinsically 
or extrinsically capable of grounding and validating the conclusions reached 
or the justifications used. 16 Legitimacy and, therefore, justice is not achieved 
by judicial conformity to a set way of proceeding, but is something that can 
only arise from within the adjudicative game itself and be generated by the 
participants' own discursive practices and institutional interactions. The 
correctness of any particular move is established through persuasion and 
argument, not proof or demonstration; the difference between 'good' and 'bad' 
moves is game-specific and must be judged within the game, even as the 
rules are being reinterpreted. Legitimacy, therefore, is something that does not 
precede or ground any judgment given, but something that follows or flows 
from the rhetorical force of the judgment made. 
  
Whereas formalist jurisprudence seeks closure and legitimacy by privileging 
the passing as the permanent, anti-formalist efforts are too ready to dismiss 
the fact that the adjudicative performance can only be made sense of as an 
exercise in rule application rather than as an unbounded exercise in judicial 
free-play. Nevertheless, this concession does not undermine the pragmatic 
claim that the adjudicative performance is an entirely fluid and contingent 
game in which 'anything might go'. While law is a game that is defined by 
and through its enabling rules, it is a game in which everything is always a 
move in the game and in which there is no way to make a move that is not 
itself a move in the game. As an activity that it always beyond absolute 
determination and never fully finished, adjudication not only passively 
allows, but also actively encourage transformative and disruptive acts 
because, without them, the game risks paralysis and irrelevance: 'the novelty 
of the unexpected "move" . . . can supply the system with that increased 
performativity it forever demands and consumes.' 17 In this way, the 
adjudicative game is played both within and with the rules that constitute it as 
a game; the limits of the game and the validity of acceptable moves within any 
particular performance of the game are not established once-and-for-all, but 
are provisional markers that are constantly being negotiated and re-negotiated 
as the game plays on. What counts as a move within the game is a part of 
the game, not apart from it. 
In this deconstructive understanding, there are two aspects to play 
indeterminacy and decision. Law's language game is a vast practice of 
almost infinitely possible moves in which each player must come to a 
decision as to which move to make. The moment and nature of the decision 
made cannot be grounded in anything outside itself; there is no possibility of 
an a contextual metric for closure. As Derrida puts it, 'the moment of 
decision, as such, must be the consequence or effect of this theoretical or 
historical moment, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it always 
marks the interruption of the juridicoor ethicoor politicocognitive 
deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it.' 18 In simple 
jurisprudential terms, the decision is never entirely explainable by or 
reducible to the rule(s) of which it claims to be an application. A particular 
performance or move cannot be detached from the general game itself 
each can only be fully appreciated in the context of the other. It is the 
subject or player that both occupies and fills the gap between the game's 
indeterminate possibilities and the determinate decision made. As such, 
judges do not stand astride the game, but are altered and shaped by the 
game's limits as they play to re-construct those limits; they are 
influenced by the present contours of the game as they influence the 
game's continuing performance and possibilities. In formalist terms, there is 
no final or enduring span between the game's general indeterminacy and 
particular decisions that is not destabilised by the constituted and 
constituting identity of the different players: indeterminacy 'is not simply 
a moment to be overcome by the occurrence of the decision, . . . [but] 
continues the decision and the latter does not close itself off from the 
former.' 19 Politics is always present and irrepressible because general 
indeterminacy both gives arise to and continues to permeate the particular 
  
decision made. 
By understanding the move from general indeterminacy in this way, it 
should be clear why my approach is pragmatic as opposed to either formalist 
or anti-formalist. It resists the conclusion that any decision is valid simply 
because it is a decision; the idea that there is complete freedom to decide 
makes no sense at all because it is only within a structure of constraints, 
albeit thoroughly contingent and revisable in content and direction, that 
decision-making can be comprehended as decision-making. Without some 
formative structure or informing context, there would be no game as a 
process of human engagement and reflection, but only a random collision 
of thought-less movements. Indeed, the very notion of choice implies a 
constrained context that identifies what is and is not being chosen 
between. At the very least, a decision has to possess an important 
element of cognition, even if the ultimate decision is to make an arbitrary 
choice. Moreover, the choice is not, as anti-formalists suppose it to be, 
between an ultimate rational grounding or a free-floating irrational grunt: 
this is only to re-install the idea of universal Reason and another false 
dichotomy between reason and non-reason. There are grounds of and for 
decisions, but they are contingent and unstable: reasons can be given as to 
why one decision is better than another, but these arguments are never 
themselves guaranteed or vouchsafed outside the context of argument. 
Consequently, legal reasoning is about the moves that are presently in 
play and which structure law's reasoning game in such a way as to enable 
choices between competing definitions of particular rules in light of their 
general indeterminacy. However, while providing an argumentative 
context for reasoning and definition, these moves are themselves being 
contingently re-worked. As such, the rules of the reasoning game do not so 
much constrain or cabin judges' room for manoeuvre as make it possible 
and operational. 
Legal reasoning, therefore, is primarily a practical activity, not an abstract 
and arcane meditation on legal intelligence. Like most practical skills, it is 
acquired by the experience of doing it and handed down from practitioner to 
practitioner: it is about 'knowing the ropes'. Legal reasoning is not a series of 
fonnulaic applications in an abstract space, but a functional engagement in 
real time; it is not a philosophical reflection, but a practical activity; it not a 
logical operation, but an exercise in operational logic. However, although it is 
primarily an activity, it does not mean that it does not have a basic structure 
nor that there are no basic guidelines to follow. Legal reasoning, therefore, 
refers as much to an attitude or style of argument as to the techniques of 
argument themselves. On these matters, I am in general agreement with 
Sunstein. However, unlike Sunstein, I maintain that a good legal argument has 
no essential hallmark that fixes it as 'good' outside of its particular context. 
This explains why a good legal decision one day might be considered 
unconvincing at a later time. This fact, of course, means that the 'soundness' of 
any particular episode of legal reasoning is to be adjudged in terms of its 
capacity to persuade other judges and lawyers in a particular community at a 
particular time rather than its analytical approximation to some logical ideal of 
argument; the fact that Brown is treated as a better legal decision than Plessy 
  
is about its political value and acceptability, not its inherent argumentative 
force and cogency. As such, therefore, while Sunstein rightly depicts legal 
reasoning as comprising a repertoire of arguments that combine to sustain a 
culture of legal reasoning, he fails to accept that those arguments and that 
culture are themselves politically dynamic and not the stabilising force that he 
and other neo-pragmatists insist. In this way, law and legal reasoning are 
treated as not so much tools or databanks, but comprise performative activities 
in the game of adjudicative interpretation. 
 
Beyond craft 
 
The traditional skills and techniques of the judicial craft are central to the 
performance of this rhetorical practice. Nonetheless, while the learned knack 
of using legal materials with adroitness and dexterity is not to be underrated, 
the effect of such a limited depiction of lawyers' special and distinctive 
expertise is that it can too easily be used to avoid the democratic 
responsibility of justifying their power and authority by reference to the real-
world pressure of getting the job done. For example, Sunstein defends a 
modest version of professional craft as the learned ability to make intuitive 
judgements about fixed points in the legal universe and to fathom ways to 
render them consistent enough to let legal reasoning proceed. Apart from its 
formalist underpinnings, this account glosses over the more ambitious claims 
made for it. By i nsisting that good lawyering must tum on a regimen of 
restraint and restriction in which 'a set of practices, conventions, and 
outcomes ... sharply constrains legal judgment' (p 13), Sunstein turns 
lawyering into an inward-looking and insular profession. This depiction of the 
judicial craft artificially and unnecessarily cuts law and adjudication off from 
the sustaining political context and rich historical resources from which they 
gain their vigour and conscience with which they achieve their highest 
democratic calling. Legal artistry demands more than technical proficiency: 
political ideals must and do combine with professional discipline in the best 
and most compelling performances of law's adjudicative game.20 
When judges begin to understand themselves as rhetorical participants 
in law's infinite language game, they become less troubled by law's 
incorrigible indeterminacy and adjudication's openness. Indeed, disabused 
of the formalist project's appeal, they might come to embrace those 
features rather than resist them. In particular, once it is fully accepted that 
law is a game of infinite possibilities, judges might abandon the beliefs 
that law and adjudication are closed and determinate practices and that 
openness and indeterminacy are to be feared. Of course, this does not 
mean participants are free to do as they wish. They are always 
participating within their extant context which they must struggle to 
change as they play within its constraints. However, once aware of the 
constructive nature of the boundaries, judges and jurists might realise that 
it is less about looking and more about seeing. When it comes to law and 
adjudication, it is people's vision that constrains them, not the legal 
materials. In this sense, change is as much a matter of imagination as 
anything else. However, such a realisation does not lead into the clutches 
of the discredited anti-formalists. Pragmatic judges will appreciate that, 
  
like pragmatic philosophers, their positive task 'is to fecundate [their] 
analytical skills with dreams and to discipline [their] dreams with 
analysis.' In striving to do this, judges will work with and through the 
rules, but there will be no governing manual of rules: there is only the 
continuing responsibility to dream and experiment in reasonable and 
reasoned ways. And, of course, there are 'no rules and regulations for 
dreaming reasonable dreams.•21 
In going about this experimental  work, judges  will take a characteristically 
pragmatic attitude towards the meaning and merit of past decisions; they 
recognise that another way of understanding the past is to imagine a better 
future for the present. Whereas formalist judges and jurists are conservative 
in the sense that they respect historical continuity for its own sake and treat the 
doctrinal past as the primary source of future enlightenment, pragmatic judges 
seek to make a critical accommodation with the legal tradition by combining 
heresy and heritage in a playful judicial style. As such, judges should consider 
themselves neither formalistically bound to perpetuate the wisdom of past 
decisions nor instrumentally free to craft future decisions; they work the 
present space between the past and the future. In the experimental spirit of a 
pragmatic critique, they might take seriously Holmes' aphorism that 'continuity 
with the past is only a necessity, not a duty.'22 So informed, they might begin 
to push through on the implications of the pragmatic insight that history and 
its situated reason are not a foundation on which to build, but a resource-site 
from which to draw: earlier decisions possess no free-standing or self-justifying 
precedential value, but must continually earn their spurs afresh through dint of 
their contemporary pertinence to new problems and contexts. Neither historical 
longevity nor contemporary newness has particular valence in fashioning 
present solutions to future problems. Understood in this non-formalist way, 
judges will be entitled to be most satisfied with themselves and their work 
when they are praised not only for the legal soundness of their work, but also for 
the inventiveness and boldness of their proposals.  Whereas the formalist mind is 
'of a doctrinaire and  authoritative complexion: the phrase must be is ever on 
its lips,' a pragmatic judge is more 'a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of 
creature' who recognises both the appeal and responsibility of experimentation. 
23  Paying attention to context and distrusting broad generalities, they must be 
conscious of their imagination's limitations and guard  against  both  the 
formalist tendency  to translate  personal  insight  into universal truth and the 
anti-formalist willingness to resign themselves uncritically to their ideological 
intuitions. Pragmatist judges do not have a license for whimsy or caprice, but 
a responsibility to do the best that they can in difficult circumstances there is 
and can be no better way. 
Within this pragmatic frame of reference, the qualities of the great 
judicial players in law's language game are not so different to those that 
are exhibited by judges that are traditionally acknowledged as part of 
law's judicial pantheon. While good judges are lauded for their technical 
abilities in parsing cases and rooting out inconsistencies, great judges 
are celebrated for their vision and inventiveness: 'dealing with great 
tasks as play . . . is a sign of greatness. '24 Those judges that take most 
seriously the experimental imperative are those that flaunt conventional 
  
standards in the process of re-formulating them; their judgments are the 
exceptions that prove the rule. Indeed, some of the great judges of the 
common law tradition, like Benjamin Cardozo in the United States, 
Alfred Denning in England, Lionel Murphy in Australia and Bertha 
Wilson in Canada, are precisely those who refuse to be hampered by 
customary habits of judicial mind. For instance, the lasting attraction of 
Learned Hand's (in)famous judgment in Carroll Towing 'the barge 
owner's duty . . . is a function of three variables: ( I ) The probability that 
she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the 
burden of adequate precautions. Possibly, it serves to bring this notion into relief 
to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the i njury, L; and the 
burden, B; liability depends on whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., 
whether B<PL' 25 is not to be found in the substantive wisdom of the decision 
and the fact that he did or did not get it right. Instead, from a pragmatic 
perspective, its canonical quality ought to be found in the playful example that 
he set by giving other judges the courage to follow their own experimental 
convictions. 
What makes Holmes, Cardozo, Denning, and Wilson into great judges is 
much the same as what makes George Best, Dick Fosbury, Mohammed Ali 
and Olga Korbut into great players: it is not whether they somehow got it 
right, but that they played with a panache, a style that caught the imagination 
and changed people's understanding of what it means to play the game. By 
making novel moves, they play the game as much with the rules as within 
the rules. Such pragmatic judges recognise that law is not something to be 
mastered, but is an infinite game of transformation in which experimentation 
and improvisation are valued above predictability and faithfulness to existing 
rules and ideas of what it is to play the game. At its most audacious, this 
style of judging demands 'the willingness to stay in play, stay with the flux, 
without bailing out at the last moment. . . [and] in keeping alive that 
indefiniteness, that possible-who-knows-when, may be-soon, maybe-now, 
that sense of working on thin ice, without assurance, keeping the play in play, 
keeping the exposure to the abyss in play, without arresting or tranquillizing 
it.'26 When played by technically skilled and imaginatively gifted players, 
legal reasoning is neither a hubristic effort to bring the game to a perfect end 
nor an irresponsible attempt to foment chaos; it is an infinitely variable process 
in which there is never any ultimate victory or performance, but only the 
repeated and unrepeatable working of the space between order and chaos, 
freedom and constraint, and permanence and contingency. 
 
Conclusion 
In this essay, therefore, I have sought to show that it is well past time to 
abandon Chief Justice Coke's claim that there is an 'artificial Reason and 
Judgment of Law which requires long Study and Experience before a Man 
can attain to the Cognizance of it.' This is a self-serving myth of lawyers, 
judges and jurists that cannot be sustained as a descriptive truth or a 
prescriptive claim and one to which Sunstein unwittingly contributes. While 
it is true that proficiency in legal reasoning, as with all other kinds of 
reasoning, is something that is attained through 'long study and experience', 
  
legal reasoning is not something that stands outside that practice, that 
disciplines that practice, or that has an independent existence from it. There 
is nothing more (or less) to legal reasoning than the practice of doing it. Again, 
like other kinds of reasoning, it is only 'artificial' in that it is not given, but is 
produced by the craft of its practitioners; it is elaborated, constituted and 
changed through its contingent performance. Accordingly, the point of my 
critique has not been to pin down some essential truths about legal argument, 
but to understand better the playful practice of adjudication as its own 
political practice and not as a reflection or embodiment of something else. I 
maintain that this can be done by  treating law's  language  as a deconstructive 
game of philosophical i mprovisation that captures 'change, movement, 
action, continuance, unlimited and unending possibility. •21 
The beauty of such a non-formalist pragmatic approach is that it can both 
recognise the way in which the game of adjudication is presently constituted 
by these particular manoeuvres and, at the same time, accept that the game of 
adjudication might come to be re-constituted by a transformed or entirely 
different set of manoeuvres. The central claim, therefore, is not that law and 
adjudication are reducible to this or any other set of game-defining rules, but 
that some set of game-defining rules are in play that, however contingently 
and temporarily, ensure that judicial players are both bound and free at one 
and the same time. Within such a jurisprudential scenario, there are at least 
two important insights that distinguish my non-formalist position from the 
pseudo-pragmatism of Sunstein that there is no argument that brings debate 
and disagreement to an end by sheer force of its own universal and cogent 
force, and that there are no arguments whatsoever that do not owe their 
existence and force to a particular context. What it means to get something 
'right' is nothing more (and nothing less) than that a combination of 
argumentative moves manages to persuade certain people for certain purposes 
at a certain time and place of their persuasive merit. In law as so much else, 
it's all in the game. 
  
  
Notes 
1. E. H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949) 73. 
2 For a fuller account of this  ambitious claim, see A. Hutchinson, It's Alt in the Game: A Non- 
Fou11datio11al Accoum of Lnw. Politics and Adjudication (forthcoming, 1998). 
3 For a general survey, see M. Brint and W. Weaver (eds), Pragmmism in Lnw and Sociery (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991); and 'Symposium: The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal  
4 Thought' (1990) 63 S Cal LRev  1569. 
4   This is what John Austin labelled 'the competition of opposing analogies'. See J. Austin. Lecrures On 
Jurisprudence (London: J. Murray, 5th ed, 1885) 653 and I 030. 
5    Sec n  1 above, 2 and 104. See also Warner, 'Three Theories of Legal Reasoning' (1989) 62 S Cal L 
Rev  1523, 1552-1556. 
6 D. Kennedy, 'Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy' in D. Kairys (ed), The Politics of 
Law (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982) 47. 
7 Brown  v Board  of Education (1954) 347 US 483; and Roe  v Wade (1973) 410 US 1 13. 
8 Plessy  v Ferguson  (1896)  163 US 537. 
9 Mcloughlin v O'Bria11 [1983] AC 410, 419 per Lord Wilberforce. 
10 See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1986). Sunstein also draws a 
comparison between incompletely theorised agreements and Rawls' idea of 'overlapping consensus'. 
See J. Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 133-172. 
11.  For a critical survey of this Judie tradition, sec M. Spariosu, Dio11ysus Reborn: Play and the Aesthetic 
Dimension in Modem Philosophical and Scie111ific Discourse (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1989). 
12 While this broadly deconstructive approach to life, games and law holds considerable promise, it must be 
emphasised that, in depicting law as being constituted by the tension between structure and play, the 
ambition is not to privilege play at the expense of structure. Those that simply want to invert the 
relation and privilege play over structure,remai n trapped within the very system they claim to subvert 
and reject: a studied 'anything goes' that pits Dionysian free-play against Apolline ruledness is simply 
the flip side and, therefore, the conti nuation of the traditionalist stance. See, for example, P. 
Feyerabend, Against Method (New York: Verso. 1975). 
13 J. Derrida, 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' in R. Macksey and E. 
Donato (eds), The Structuralist Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) 254. 
14   ibid 248, 264-265, 265 and 260. 
15 See HL.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1994). For a fuller account of 
this dynamic relation, see A. Hutchinson, 'A Postmodern·s Hart: Taking Rules Sceptically' (1995) 58 
MLR 783. 
16 See J-F. Lyotard and J-L. Thibaud, Just Gaming (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985) 
28 and 43. 
17 J-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984) 15. See, also, S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (Durham, NC: Duke 
University  Press,  1989) 355-358. 
18 J.  Derrida,  'Force  of  Law:  The  Mystical  Foundation  of  Authority'  in  D.  Cornell  et  al  (eds), 
Deconstruction  And the Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge,  1992). 
19 J. Derrida, 'A Response' in C. Mouffe (ed), Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Simon Critchley, 
Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau, and Richard Rorty (London: Routledge, 1996) 87. 
20 See Hutchi nson, n 15 above, 815-817. The reference to 'political ideals' is, of course, to be 
understood in a pragmatic  way: no particular results or consequences necessarily follow from the 
adoption of such a commitment and there is no one tried-and-true programme for political action 
because politics itself is always contestable and can never be a privileged grou nd for anything. Once a 
pragmatic critique becomes doctrinaire or programmatic, it ceases to be pragmatic. 
21 S. Rosen, The limits of Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1980) 260. 
22 O.W. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1920) 270. 
23 W. James, Pragmatism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981) 124. 
24 'Ecco Homo' in F. Nietzsche,  The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: The Modern Library, 1954) 
853. 
25 US v Carroll Towing Co (2d Cir. 1947) 159 F.2d 169. 
26 J.  Caputo,  Radical  Hermeneutics:  Repetition,  Deconstruction  aizd  the  Hermeneutic  Project 
(Bloomi ngton: Indiana University Press, 1987) 198-199. 
27 H.  Baker,  Jr,  Blues  Ideology  and  Afro-American  Lileralure:  A   Vernacular  Theory  (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984) 8. 
 
 
